

## **“Public Choice” Theory with Logical Indicators**

(from Dunn, 2012, pp 150-151)

1. [SINCE] Public employees working in very large public bureaucracies are rational, self-interested individuals who pursues maximizing strategies “economic man”).
2. [AND] The desire for career advancement is a consequence of rational self-interest.
3. [THEREFORE] Public employees strive to advance their career opportunities.
4. [SINCE] The advancement of career opportunities is a consequence of favorable recommendations from superiors.
5. [AND] Favorable recommendations from superiors are a consequence of receiving favorable information from subordinates.
6. [THEREFORE] Subordinates striving to advance their careers will forward favorable information and suppress unfavorable information.
7. [SINCE] The repression of unfavorable information creates errors by management, reducing their flexibility in a adapting to rapidly changing conditions.
8. [AND] The repression of unfavorable information diminishes managerial control.
9. [THEREFORE] Managers compensate for their loss of control by attempting to tighten control. Compensatory attempts to tighten control further encourage the repression of unfavorable information and (6) the magnification of management errors (7). Further (8) loss of control produces attempts to tighten control.
10. [AND] Compensatory tightening of control is a consequence of the size of public bureaucracies.
11. [SINCE] Compensatory tightening of control requires the expenditure of a larger proportion of effort on management activities, and a smaller proportion of output activities.
12. [Therefore] The larger the public bureaucracy the smaller the proportion of effort expanded on output activities in relation to size, that is, the less the return to scale.

Dunn, W. N. (2012). *Public policy analysis: An introduction* (5th. ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.

